UNCITRAL Working Group III on ISDS Reform: How Cross-Cutting Issues Reshape Reform Options by Cotula, Lorenzo et al.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
Staff Publications Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
7-2019 
UNCITRAL Working Group III on ISDS Reform: How Cross-Cutting 
Issues Reshape Reform Options 
Lorenzo Cotula 
International Institute for Environment and Development, lorenzo.cotula@iied.org 
Thierry Berger 
International Institute for Environment and Development, thierry.berger@iied.org 
Lise Johnson 
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, ljj2107@columbia.edu 
Brooke Güven 
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, brooke.guven@law.columbia.edu 
Jesse Coleman 
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Development, jcoleman@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/
sustainable_investment_staffpubs 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, 
International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Securities Law Commons, and the 
Transnational Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lorenzo Cotula, Thierry Berger, Lise Johnson, Brooke Güven & Jesse Coleman, UNCITRAL Working Group 
III on ISDS Reform: How Cross-Cutting Issues Reshape Reform Options, (2019). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_staffpubs/148 
This Memo/Briefing Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Columbia Center on Sustainable 









UNCITRAL Working Group III 
on ISDS Reform:  
How Cross-Cutting Issues 




15 July 2019 
 
 
1 This document was submitted, with the title Reshaping the Reform Agenda: Concerns Identified and Cross-Cutting Issues 
to UNCITRAL Working Group III on ISDS Reform in accordance with paragraph 83 of document A/CN.9/970 (Report of 
Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its 37th session (New York, 1–5 April 2019)). 
That paragraph, and the discussion it reflects, invited submissions by states and other stakeholders on reform options to 
inform UNCITRAL’s efforts in identifying and prioritizing particular solutions UNCITRAL will develop in the next phase 
of its work. The submission was prepared by Lorenzo Cotula (IIED), Thierry Berger (IIED), Lise Johnson (CCSI), Brooke 
Güven (CCSI) and Jesse Coleman (CCSI). 
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1. At its 36th session (Vienna, 29 October–2 November 2018), UNCITRAL Working Group III on 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Reform (WGIII) identified three broad categories of 
concern for which ISDS reform was deemed desirable: 
• Concerns relating to the lack of consistency, coherence, predictability and ‘correctness’ of 
arbitral decisions;2 
• Concerns relating to arbitrators and decision makers;3 and 
• Concerns relating to costs and duration of ISDS cases.4  
2. In addition, at its 37th session (New York, 1–5 April 2019), WGIII concluded that reform was 
desirable in order to address concerns related to the definition and the use or regulation of third-
party funding in ISDS.5 At its 37th session, WGIII also engaged in a discussion to identify 
possible additional concerns not already addressed in its deliberations. WGIII discussed the 
following issues: 
• Means other than arbitration to resolve investment disputes as well as dispute prevention 
methods;6  
• Exhaustion of local remedies;7  
• Implications for third parties, and the role of third-party participation, including 
participation both by the general public and by local communities affected by the 
investment or the dispute at hand;8  
• Investor obligations and counterclaims;9  
• Regulatory chill;10 and 
• Damages.11  
3. WGIII noted that these issues related to:12  
• Concerns that had already been identified (e.g., third-party participation, which WGIII 
partly linked to concerns about the consistency and correctness of arbitral decisions,13 and 
damages, which WGIII linked, “for example,” to concerns about correctness of arbitral 
decisions14); 
• Tools to be considered by WGIII in Phase 3 of its mandate (e.g., means other than 
 
2 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) ‘Report of Working Group III 
(Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Sixth Session (Vienna, 29 October–2 
November 2018)’ (hereafter UNCITRAL, ‘36th Session Report’). Concerns include: 1) divergent interpretations 
of substantive standards, divergent interpretations relating to jurisdiction and admissibility and procedural 
inconsistency (para. 39); 2) lack of a framework to address multiple proceedings (para. 53); and 3) limitations in 
the current mechanisms to address inconsistency and incorrectness of arbitral decisions (para. 63). 
3 Including: 1) lack or apparent lack of independence and impartiality (UNCITRAL, ‘36th Session Report’ (n 1) 
para. 83); 2) limitations in existing challenge mechanisms (para. 90); 3) lack of diversity of decision makers 
(para. 98); and 4) qualifications of decision makers (para. 106). 
4 Including: 1) lengthy and costly ISDS proceedings and the lack of a mechanism to address frivolous or 
unmeritorious cases (UNCITRAL, ‘36th Session Report’ (n 1) paras. 122 and 123); 2) allocation of costs in 
ISDS (para. 127); and 3) concerns regarding the availability of security for cost in ISDS (para. 133). 
5 UNCITRAL, ‘Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its 
Thirty-Seventh Session (New York, 1–5 April 2019)’ (hereinafter UNCITRAL, ‘37th Session Report’), para. 25. 
6 ibid para. 29. 
7 ibid para. 30. 
8 ibid paras. 31–33. 
9 ibid paras. 34–35. 
10 ibid paras. 36–37. 
11 ibid para. 38. 
12 ibid para. 39. 
13 ibid para. 33; see also UNCITRAL, ‘36th Session Report’ (n 1) paras 59, 61. 
14 UNCITRAL, ‘37th Session Report’ (n 5) para. 38. 
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arbitration to resolve investment disputes as well as dispute prevention methods;15 
exhaustion of local remedies16); and 
• “Guiding principles for developing reforms” (e.g., addressing regulatory chill, including 
with regards to the “inherent asymmetric nature of the ISDS system, costs associated with 
the ISDS proceedings, and high amounts of damages awarded by tribunals”;17 not 
foreclosing “consideration of the possibility that claims might be brought against an investor 
where there was a legal basis for doing so”18). 
4. Based on these observations, WGIII resolved to consider the issues listed in paragraph 2 above as 
part of its exploration of possible reforms to address the concerns that have been identified (rather 
than as additional concerns at the current stage).19 In effect, WGIII  framed these aspects as cross-
cutting issues to be considered in Phase 3 of its mandate. 
5. WGIII reiterated that this conclusion “did not preclude other concerns to be identified and dealt 
with at a later stage of the deliberations.”20 It also noted that any work by WGIII would need to 
take into account developments in investment treaties, so that the solutions developed by WGIII 
are flexible enough to adapt to a rapidly changing international policy context.21  
6. To support WGIII in the implementation of this approach, Table 1 illustrates how consideration 
of the cross-cutting issues affects the contours of the concerns WGIII has identified and of 
possible options for reform. Separate submissions to WGIII discuss in greater detail: implications 
for third parties and issues concerning third-party participation;22 regulation of third-party funding 
(and draft text  to accomplish this objective);23 and a multilateral framework on termination and 
withdrawal of consent, which illustrates how the UNCITRAL process could be used to provide 
space for other means of dispute settlement.24  
7. The issues identified in Table 1 are relevant to WGIII’s discussion of reform options, including 
those identified as more structural in nature, those that can be applied to the current ad hoc ISDS 
system or those that straddle these lines. As illustrated in Table 1, considering the cross-cutting 
issues will help ensure that, as WGIII proceeds to the next phase of its reform discussions, it 
broadly surveys the range of potential options and takes a holistic view of their implications. In 
practice, it would mean that: 
• The cross-cutting issues are fully integrated in WGIII’s work and reflected in its project 
schedule(s); 
• WGIII sessions devoted to reform options for the concerns identified further consider how 
the cross-cutting issues affect the concern at stake and related reform options; 
• WGIII periodically revisits whether developments in its deliberations warrant additional 
concerns to be specifically identified and addressed; 
 
15 ibid para. 29. 
16 ibid para. 30. 
17 ibid paras. 36–37. 
18 ibid para. 35. 
19 ibid para. 39. 
20 ibid 
21 ibid para. 40. 
22 CCSI, IIED and IISD, ‘Third Party Rights in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Options for Reform 
(Submission to UNCITRAL Working Group III on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, 15 July 2019).’ 
23 CCSI, IISD and IIED, ‘Draft Text Providing for Transparency and Prohibiting Certain Forms of Third-Party 
Funding in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Submission to UNCITRAL Working Group III on Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Reform, 15 July 2019).’ 
24 CCSI, IIED and IISD, ‘Draft Treaty Language: Withdrawal of Consent to Arbitrate and Termination of 
International Investment Agreements (Submission to UNCITRAL Working Group III on Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Reform, 15 July 2019).’ 
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• The cross-cutting issues are duly considered in any activities organized in connection with 
the work of WGIII, such as seminars, colloquia or online discussions that are formally or 
informally linked to WGIII; 
• WGIII and the UNCITRAL Secretariat are endowed with adequate resources to consider the 
cross-cutting issues and their implications for reform options, including development of any 
technical analysis necessary to support WGIII’s deliberations. 
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Table 1. Cross-cutting issues: Illustrative implications for Phase 3 of WGIII’s mandate 
Concerns identified → 
Cross-cutting issues ↓ 
Concerns pertaining to the 
lack of consistency, coherence, 
predictability and correctness 
of arbitral decisions 
Concerns pertaining 
to arbitrators and 
decision makers 
Concerns pertaining to cost and 
duration of ISDS cases 
Concerns pertaining to 
third-party funding 
Means other than 
arbitration to resolve 
investment disputes as 
well as dispute 
prevention methods 
Consider alternatives to ISDS, such as domestic courts, ombudsmen, alternative dispute resolution and state-to state dispute 
settlement  
Consider limits on the causes of action that can be pursued through ISDS (e.g., to denial of justice) 
Consider rules on referral to other courts and/or expert bodies and on staying ISDS disputes while related proceedings are 
pending that might narrow or resolve issues relevant to the ISDS claim or defence 
Exhaustion of domestic 
remedies 
Consider requiring exhaustion as 
a means of clarifying and 
crystallizing the scope of legal 
and factual issues for resolution 
at the international level, 
potentially reducing scope for 
inconsistent or incorrect 
decisions 
Consider requiring 
exhaustion for all or 
some causes of action 








adjudicators, each with 
different sociocultural 
backgrounds, areas of 
expertise and powers 
of review 
Consider the effect on duration of 
ISDS proceedings and duration of 
overall proceedings from initiation 
of claim through post-award 
challenges 
Consider the effect of 
exhaustion on the nature 
and availability of third-
party funding of claims 
Implications for third 
parties25 
Consider participation by actors 
specifically affected by the 
investment or the dispute, 
beyond amicus curiae 
submissions, in order to promote 
correct interpretation and 
application of all relevant norms 
Consider dismissal or reframing 
of claims where affected third 
parties cannot be joined, so as to 
prevent inconsistent and 
incorrect interpretations of their 
rights 
Consider ways to 
ensure decision 
makers have expertise 
in key relevant areas 
of law, including 
outside of investment 
law and in issues 
raised by community–
investor disputes 
Consider processes for 
referral to other courts 
and/or expert bodies 
and stays of 
proceedings pending 
resolution of third 
parties’ rights 
Consider arrangements to ensure 
that enhanced third-party 
participation does not unduly 
increase cost or duration26 
Consider rules on dismissal where 
impacts on affected third parties 
give rise to risks of multiple 
proceedings 
Consider how addressing issues 
relating to third parties may affect 
overall cost and duration, 
including by avoiding or 
consolidating claims 
Consider whether/how 
disclosure or other rules 
regarding third-party 
funding would govern 
participation by and/or 
funding of third parties 
 
25 Further discussion of implications for the rights of third parties is in the separate submission CCSI, IIED and 
IISD, ‘Third Party Rights in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Options for Reform’ (n 23). 
26 This may involve, for example, case management rules including strict deadlines and limiting size of party 
and third-party submissions. However, WGIII emphasized that “ensuring due and fair process as well as 
guaranteeing the quality and correctness of the outcomes should not be sacrificed for the sake of speedy 
resolution of ISDS” (UNCITRAL, ‘36th Session Report’ (n 1) para. 117). 
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Concerns identified → 
Cross-cutting issues ↓ 
Concerns pertaining to the 
lack of consistency, coherence, 
predictability and correctness 
of arbitral decisions 
Concerns pertaining 
to arbitrators and 
decision makers 
Concerns pertaining to cost and 
duration of ISDS cases 
Concerns pertaining to 
third- party funding 
Counterclaims Consider providing greater 
clarity regarding issues on which 
arbitral jurisprudence is divided 
(e.g., nature of the required 
connection between claim and 
counterclaim) 
Consider how use of 
counterclaims can address issues 
of inconsistency across 
otherwise separate proceedings 
Consider how to ensure 
consistency and coherence 
across legal regimes, including 
by allocating decision-making 
authority across those regimes 
Consider ways to 
ensure decision 
makers have expertise 
in key relevant areas 
of law, including 
investor legal 
compliance issues 
Consider processes for 
referral to other courts 
and/or expert bodies 




Consider arrangements to ensure 
that counterclaims do not unduly 
increase cost or duration27 
Weigh costs and benefits of 
permitting counterclaims with 
costs and benefits of requiring 
those claims to be pursued in 
different fora 
Consider whether/how 
disclosure or other rules 
regarding third-party 
funding would govern 
state receipt of funding in 
the context of 
counterclaims 
Regulatory chill Consider removing or restricting access to ISDS through, e.g.: 
- Requiring exhaustion of local remedies 
- Limiting some or all causes of action or issues to state-to-state dispute resolution28 
- Including state-to-state filters that claims must pass through before going to ISDS 
Consider arrangements to 
increase consistency and 
predictability (e.g., an appeal 
mechanism), in order to mitigate 
regulatory chill concerns 
Consider providing greater 
clarity regarding rules for 
dismissing frivolous claims and 
related costs 
Consider clarifying 
rules on deference to 
factual and legal 
determinations and 
policy preferences of 
domestic (or other) 
government bodies or 
adjudicators 
Consider issues concerning 
calculation of damages, as well as 
legal and arbitration costs, in order 
to reduce the incentive to sue for 
monetary damages, reduce the 
overall financial cost of ISDS and 
mitigate its impact on public 
decision making 
Consider making “costs follow the 
event” the default rule 
Consider requiring security for 
costs 
Consider sanctions against counsel 
for frivolous or abusive claims 
Consider strengthened pleading 
standards 
Consider transparency of 
third-party funding and 
funding arrangements in 
order to understand the 
role of third-party funding 
in ISDS and its impact on 
certain categories of 
claims 
Consider whether to 
prohibit funding or 
otherwise limit the types 
of claims that can be 
funded29 
 
27 Commentary in the previous footnote applies mutatis mutandis. 
28 This could draw on the approach used in the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement. A 
convention could be used whereby states could substitute state-to-state dispute settlement for ISDS for some or 
all causes of action, for some or all treaties. A discussion of how this could be done is in the separate submission 
CCSI, IIED and IISD, ‘Draft Treaty Language: Withdrawal of Consent to Arbitrate and Termination of 
International Investment Agreements’ (n 25). 
29 See separate submission CCSI, IISD and IIED, ‘Draft Text Providing for Transparency and Prohibiting 
Certain Forms of Third-Party Funding in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (n 23). 
7 
Concerns identified → 
Cross-cutting issues ↓ 
Concerns pertaining to the 
lack of consistency, coherence, 
predictability and correctness 
of arbitral decisions 
Concerns pertaining 
to arbitrators and 
decision makers 
Concerns pertaining to cost and 
duration of ISDS cases 
Concerns pertaining to 
third-party funding 
Calculation of damages Consider arrangements to 
increase consistency and 
predictability as regards the 
burdens of proof and the legal 
standards for assessing damages 
Consider increasing consistency 
with norms regarding damages 
assessments in other relevant 
areas of law and policy 
Expand availability of 
review for errors of 
fact and law in 
damages assessments 
Consider clarifying the evidence 
required and the methods used for 
the calculation of damages, so as 
to reduce the overall financial cost 
of ISDS 
Consider rules on early disclosure 
of nature of damages claims and 
support for those claims 
Consider clarifying rules on cost 
shifting, interest and recoverability 
Consider clarifying the 
evidence required and the 
methods used for the 
calculation of damages, as 
well as legal and 
arbitration costs 
Consider caps on the 
amount or percent of 
damages and/or interest a 
third-party funder may 
recover (to the extent such 
funding is permitted) 
 
